## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

COUNTRY Chilas

Political Information: General MA Chan-shan's Interview with the Generalisaism 1

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Until early December 1946, General NA Chan-shan was still optimistic about the ressibility of his getting an acceptable appointment (previously reported) from the Central Government which would allow him to proceed to Manchuria and restore order to whatever portion of the Northeast CHIANG Kai-shek saw fit to assign to him. However, on about 10 December he received a telegram from CHIEN Chiang concerning MA's own special troops, which MA feels were primarily responsible for helding Tatung (112-14, 40-06) against the Chinese Communists in the Fall of 1946. These troops, which have traditionally belonged to MA for many years are loyal to him and consider him "their" general just as he considers them "his" troops. They were about 20,000 men organized into the two divisions of the "Fortheast Advance Corps", which were generally considered (certainly by KA and his followers) to be the units which would accompany MA in his expected return to Eanchuria to organize his irregular forces (previously reported). CH'EN's telegram informed MA that his two divisions were to be reorganized into two cavalry brigades and would be turned over to FU Tso-yi. (The former division commanders would still command the brigades.) MA was surprised and angered at the unexpected move, and decided to go to Manking immediately.

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This document is hereby regraded to CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the letter of 13 October 1978 from the Director of central Intelligence to the Arterist of the United States.

On 19 December MA flew to Manking, registered at the Generalissimo's Headquarters, and requested an interview with CHIANG Kai-shek. CHIANG at first refused to see MA, but after five days of silence and upon a more insistent request by MA, he gave MA an audience on the sixth day. MA was greated without cordiality, and he could tell by CHIANG's "extremely unpleasant" look that he was not velcome. CHIANG immediately teld MA that he should have come earlier and then asked why will had not gone back to Manchuria. MA replied that if CHIANG referred to MA's appointment to be a deputy of TU Yu-ming, the appointment was not satisfactory and that he did not feel that as one of the many deputies of TU that he could work effectively. MA then said that he was not concerned about the size of a territory assigned to him, but that he wanted to be fully responsible for what occured there; he then requested that the Generalissimo assign him even a very small portion of the Mortheast, an area where freedom of action and full responsibility for that action would be MA's, with responsibility not to TU but to Manking. CHIANG did not reply to this. Then MA asked CHANG what his responsibilities would be fully responsible, as he had a good name in Manchuria, and that he did not want to lose it, that he must know what his mission would be, what he could tell his followers he was supposed to do. CHIANG then advised MA to go to Mukden and take

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
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his instructions from General HSIUNG Shih-hui, Chairman of the President's Readquarters for the Kortheast. MA was indignant at this complete and abrupt refusal of CPIANG to talk on any basis except that of MA's subscribation to the Kuomintane generals. He immediately left without further discussion.

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- 3. After the interview with CHIANG, EA talked with CHIEN Chieng. CHIEN said that EA had come too late, that if IA had come three months earlier, there might have been scrething for him to do. EA felt that he was insulted by the implication that he was a "job-secker".
- 4. After his conference with the Nationalist Chief of Staff, MA loarned from a friend of his who had talked to one of CHTP's close associates, of remarks which CHTPM had made after talking to MA. CHTPM had said that MA was too old and too inexperienced in modern warfare; that MA was of little value; that it was better to use a Whampon Military Academy man who was trained in modern military techniques.
- 5. After a total of ten days in "anking, EA, angry, dispusted, and disaprointed, went to Shanghai where he spent several days before he returned by sea to Tientsin and thence to Feiping, cassing through Tientsin on 22 January. He feels that his mission to Fanking and his previous attempts to converse with the Central Government have been complete failures and sees no possibility of serving the Central Government as it exists at present.

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